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ABSTRACT
The goal of a kidney exchange program (KEP) is to maximize number of transplants within a pool
of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP can be modelled as a maximum
matching problem in a graph. A KEP between incompatible patient-donor from pools of several
hospitals, regions or countries has the potential to increase the number of transplants. These entities
aim is to maximize the transplant benefit for their patients, which can lead to strategic behaviours.
Recently, this was formulated as a non-cooperative two-player game and the game solutions (equilib-
ria) were characterized when the entities objective function is the number of their patients receiving
a kidney. In this paper, we generalize these results for N -players and discuss the impact in the game
solutions when transplant information quality is introduced. Furthermore, the game theory model
is analyzed through computational experiments on instances generated through the Canada Kidney
Paired Donation Program. These experiments highlighting the importance of using the concept of
Nash equilibrium, as well as, the anticipation of the necessity to further research for supporting
police makers once measures on transplant quality are available.
Keywords Kidney exchange program · Non-cooperative · Nash equilibria · Social welfare · Maximum matching ·
Graft survival
1 Introduction
Kidney exchange programs. A patient suffering from chronic kidney disease can see their life quality significantly
improved by receiving a transplant of a compatible kidney. Typically, patients are registered in a waiting list and
whenever a deceased donor arrives an allocation algorithm is run to determine to which patient in the waiting list the
graft will be offered. The allocation algorithms are designed in way that reflects utilitarian and equitable objectives.
In addition, a patient can also receive a kidney transplantation from a healthy relative or a friend willing to make the
donation.
Unfortunately, the allocation of deceased donors is far from meeting the demand for kidney transplant and living
donors may not be able to donate to their loved one due physiologically incompatiblility. Around one in a thousand
European citizens suffer from end stage renal disease ref [2012]. In United States and Canada it is the 9th and 11th,
respectively, leading cause of death each year ref [a,c]. In particular, in 2017, 78% of the Canadians on the waiting list
∗Parts of this material are based on data and information provided by Canadian Blood Services. However, the analyses, conclu-
sions, opinions and statements expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Canadian Blood Services
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
09
20
7v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
0 N
ov
 20
19
CARVALHO AND LODI
2-way exchange 3-way exchange
Figure 1: Vertices represent incompatible patient-donor pairs and arcs represent compatibilities.
for an organ were waiting for a kidney ref [c]. This disease has a high economic impact on national health services ref
[b,c]. Moreover, the number of Canadians living with end-stage kidney disease has grown ref [c].
In an attempt to tackle the organ shortage, living-donor exchanges have been proposed, that is, patients with an
incompatible living-donor can exchange donors. This lead to the kidney exchange programs (KEPs) for which the
main goal is to maximize number of transplants within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging
donors. Incompatible pairs exchange donors as follows: if the donor in one pair is compatible with the patient of
another pair and vice-versa, we have a feasible 2-exchange; this concept can be extended to L-exchanges with L ≥ 2;
see Figure 1. Nowadays, KEPs are run in many countries; e.g., see Biro´ et al. [2017, 2018] for a recent report on
current practices in Europe and Malik and Cole [2014] about the Canadian program. There is an extensive literature
formulating the problem with integer programming models and developing techniques to solve it efficiently Abraham
et al. [2007], Constantino et al. [2013], Dickerson et al. [2016], Glorie et al. [2014], Manlove and O’Malley [2012].
As a rule of thumb, the problem is centralized, that is, there is one decision maker deciding the exchanges to be
executed; in general the goal is to maximize the number of patients receiving a donation, but other criteria have also
been considered.
Multi-agent programs. In U.S., UNOS and NKR are platforms for cross hospital KEPs. An international exchange
between Czech Republic and Austria has taken place Bo¨hmig et al. [2017]. In August 2018, another international ex-
change was performed between a pair from Spain and another from Italy ref [d]. Currently, the hypothesis of an
European Program ref [f] is being investigated with already some cross-border programs in place, e.g.. Scandiatrans-
plant Kidney Paired Exchange Program and South Alliance for Transplant. In September 2019, it was announced a
joint kidney exchange program between Australia and New Zealand ref [e]. Therefore, there is a recent motivation to
study KEPs that can have incompatible pairs belonging to different agents (which can be hospitals, regions or coun-
tries) in an attempt to reach a higher social benefit in comparison to the individual case. Under these circumstances,
the optimization cannot be anymore simply the maximization of the total number of exchanges: it is expected that
each agent behaves strategically with the goal of maximizing the number of its patients receiving a transplant. In
fact, the centralized platforms UNOS and NKR do not register a high level of exchanges across hospitals Agarwal
et al. [2019]. In this context, the literature has focused in individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms which
are centralized kidney exchange programs that guarantee that each agent matches an equal or greater number of its
patients and there is incentive for the agents to truthfully reveal all their incompatible patient-donor pairs. In order to
achieve these characteristics, it has been proven that the social optimum (maximum number of exchanges when there
is full collaboration) might be scarified. Table 1 provides the current landscape of known approximation ratios on the
maximum number of grafts (social welfare) for these mechanisms. The values in bold correspond to the mechanisms
that are tight, i.e., the mechanisms that match the upper bound. We note that in this context, strategy-proofness implies
individual rationality. Note that the social optimum is sacrified in order to get strategy-proofness. However, Blum et al.
[2017] can achieve positive results by considering arbitrary graphs and using the fact that vertices are associated with
players at random; under some conditions, it is proven that an optimal matching is likely to be individually rational.
The authors also provide a simple mechanism which is individually rational and likely to be optimal.
The Bayesian approaches model the exchange pool as a random graph that generally is generated based on blood
type and tissue type compatibility distributions. In Ashlagi and Roth [2011, 2014], it is shown that in almost all large
graphs, individual rationality is close to the social welfare optimum. Toulis and Parkes [2011, 2015] show a similar
result with the difference that a fixed number of hospitals has a very large pool, while in Ashlagi and Roth [2011,
2014] there is a growing number of small hospitals.
While the previous papers study the static case, the recent paper of Hajaj et al. [2015] considers a multi-period dynamic
model where a credit mechanism is build, proven to be strategy-proof and to lead to a global maximum matching; that
approach does not rely on the structure of the compatibility graph, it assumes that each patient-donor pair remains only
one period in the pool and a prior knowledge of the average arrival rate of pairs to each hospital.
For the first time, Carvalho et al. [2017] modeled the cross agent KEPs as a non-cooperative game. By giving to
the players the power of deciding their internal exchanges, they have incentive to truthfully present their individual
2
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No assumption on graph structure
Individually Deterministic Randomized
rational strategy-proof strategy-proof
# Players L approx. UB approx UB approx UB
2 2 1 1
2
1
2
2
3
4
5
≥ 2 2 1 1
2
1
2
4
5
≥ 3 1
L−1
1
L−1
1
2
4
5
Literature Bayesian Approach
Ashlagi and Roth [2011, 2014] X X X X
Toulis and Parkes [2011, 2015] X
Ashlagi et al. [2015] X X
Caragiannis et al. [2015] X
Blum et al. [2017] X
Table 1: Summary of results for centralized mechanisms on static KEPs.
KEPs. Furthermore, it is proven and argued that the game outcome is a social optimum. These results, focus on the
two-player case.
Finally, there have been investigations that do not consider strategical issues (e.g., by assuming that agents agreed on a
protocol). Klimentova et al. [2019] focus on fairness questions through a compensation mechanism. Biro´ et al. [2019]
analyze the impact of cross-border KEPs when participating countries may have different constraints and objective
functions. In another paper, Biro´ et al. [2019] apply a cooperative game theoretical approach, where the goal is to
determine an international matching that is as close as possible from the core solution (which in the context of KEPs
cannot be used as it is generally illegal to make monetary transactions for transplantations).
Our contribution and paper structure. While in the U.S. the market is fragmented due to hospitals’ strategic
behavior, in European countries and in Canada, there are single national KEPs where collaboration among hospitals
is mandatory. In this context, in Section 2, we recover the positive theoretical results of the non-cooperative KEP
in Carvalho et al. [2017], generalize them for any finite number of players and provide a new interpretation within
nationwide programs; we remark that under this game setting each player goal is to maximize the number of her
patients receiving a kidney.
Furthermore, in Section 3, we discuss the impact in the game social welfare when a measure of transplant quality
is introduced in the game and thus, players’ goals move from the cardinality case to a weighted one. Associating
weights to transplantations has been considered in the context of KEPs in an attempt to reflect equity (prioritize
certain patients); for example, Freedman et al. [2018] develop a framework to learn societal weights. Distinct from
the literature, our motivation to introduce weights comes from recent efforts to predict graft quality. Massie et al.
[2016] build a risk index for living donor kidney transplantation and more recently, Luck et al. [2017, 2018] use
machine learning techniques on the problem of predicting the outcome (graft quality) of a kidney transplant when a
pair donor-patient is matched. Such prediction widely enlarges the quantity of information that is present in the system
and, of course, helps determining the benefit of each matching, highly distinguishing one from another. Information
on transplantations’ quality will lead to consider an objective function further away from cardinality (maximizing the
number of transplants) and definitely more into a weighted sum (overall time between failures). However, when a
measure of graft quality is associated with transplantations, we prove that it becomes computationally hard to even
verify an equilibrium. Consequently, it would be expected that the game outcome would not be an equilibrium. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the addition of information on the quality of a transplant to the
multi-agent setting is discussed.
In Section 4, we corroborate our analysis with extensive computational experiments that highlight the importance of
considering game theoretical concepts for planning exchanges, as well as its current limitations. Our results allow us
to conclude that when players maximize the number of transplants, strategies must be carefully computed in order to
guarantee that the game outcome is simultaneously an equilibrium and a social welfare optimum. When players use
additional quantitative information, although the negative theoretical results, in practice, equilibria close to be social
optimal exist and they can be efficiently computed.
Section 5 concludes this paper, summarizing our contributions and drawing the current open questions.
2 Background
2.1 Preliminares
As the papers on mechanism design, Carvalho et al. [2017] restrict their analysis to games with 2-way exchanges, i.e.,
L = 2. In the remaining of the paper, we will focus on KEPs with this exchange bound. Mathematically, restricting
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to L = 2 has the advantage that the problem reduces to matchings on graphs, which is a well understood structure (as
it will be revised during the course of this paper) and for such case KEPs can be solved in polynomial time, while for
L > 2 the problem becomes NP-hard. In practice, most KEPs prioritize 2-way exchanges (e.g., the Scandiatransplant
KEP) as they lead to more robust solutions (in this case, a vertex failure minimizes the damage on the overall solution)
and in fact, there are national KEPs that only consider L = 2 (e.g., France and Sweden).
LetN = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of players. For each p ∈ N , Gp = (V p, Ep) is player p’s internal compatibility
graph, i.e., the set of vertices V p represents the set of incompatible patient-donor pairs in player p’s pool and the set
of edges Ep represents the pairwise compatibilities within V p. Let EI be the set of external (international) edges, i.e.,
(a, b) ∈ EI if a ∈ V i and b ∈ V j with i 6= j. The set EIp represents the subset of EI incident with vertices in V p.
The overall game graph is G = (V,E) with V = ∪np=1V p and E = EI ∪np=1 Ep.
A subset Mp ⊆ Ep is called a matching of graph Gp if no two edges of it share the same node. In this non-
cooperative game, each player p strategy is a matching Mp of Gp. The game goes as follows. First, the players
simultaneously share their pools Gp and EI is determined. Then, independently, each player p selects a matching
Mp of Gp and, simultaneously, players reveal their internal matching to the system which we call independent agent
(IA). Finally, IA selects a matching of maximum cardinality M I(M1, . . . ,Mn) in the remaining international graph
(V,EI(M1, . . . ,Mn)) where EI(M1, . . . ,Mn) = {(a, b) ∈ EI : a, b not incident with edges in ∪np=1 Mp}. When-
ever the context makes it clear, we drop the dependence of the IA matching on the players strategies and simply write
M I . Let M Ip be the subset of M
I which is incident with vertices in V p. In order to ensure that the players can un-
ambiguously compute M I , for
−→
M = (M1, . . . ,Mn), we define A(−→M) has the deterministic algorithm that computes
M I ; given a matching M such that M ∩ EI 6= ∅, then we define −→M = (M ∩ E1, . . . ,M ∩ En), i.e., the matched
edges in EI are ignored. For sake of simplicity and whenever the context makes it clear, we use the notation M I to
represent the IA decision which implicitly uses algorithm A and depends on the players internal matchings.
The utility function of each player is the number of her patients receiving a kidney, i.e.,
2|Mp|+ |M Ip |. (1)
Note that by construction, it seems intuitive that each player p will truthfully reveal the Gp since it is player p that
controls the internal exchanges that will take place and, by providing true information, the player can evaluate the full
potential of the game. For now, let us assume that this holds, and in the next section, we come back to this point and
provide formal prove to this intuition.
The goal of a non-cooperative game is to determine the game outcome. The concept of solution used by Carvalho
et al. [2017] is that of pure Nash equilibrium (NE). The vector of internal matchings (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn) is a NE if
for each p ∈ N
2|Mp|+ |M Ip | ≥ 2|Rp|+ |M Ip (M−p, Rp)| ∀ matching Rp of Gp, (2)
where the operator (·)−p denotes (·) except player p.
The social welfare value for a game where players play (M1,M2, . . . ,Mn) is the total number of patients receiving
a kidney. A social optimum is a maximum matching of the overall graph game G = (V,E), i.e., a matching in which
the social welfare value is maximized. A social welfare equilibrium (SWE) is a NE that is also a social optimum.
Carvalho et al. [2017] proved that there is always a SWE for the 2-player game which can be computed in polynomial
time, and they briefly discussed the potential extension to the N -player case. We take on from that discussion and we
formally prove the following result.
Theorem 2.1. For any game with a set of players N and any deterministic algorithmA for the IA, there is a SWE and
it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.
SWE are Pareto efficient and, for the two player case, Carvalho et al. [2017] build an algorithm that, given any NE
that is not a social optimum as input, outputs a SWE that dominates it. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that players
will focus on SWE; this phenomenon is called the focal-point-effect; see Schelling [1960].
2.2 Market Design: impact on social welfare
The way in which players’ interaction is designed in a game significantly impacts the social welfare. Indeed, by
looking to Table 1, it can be concluded that strategy-proof mechanisms cannot guarantee that the social optimum is
4
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 2: Player 1 owns the white circles and player 2 owns the gray diamonds.
1 3
2
4
MI
1 3
2
4
MI
Figure 3: Player 1 owns the white circles, player 2 owns the gray diamonds and player 3 owns the magenta squares. In
the left figure, when all players reveal their pairs, IA selects the matching {(1, 4)}. In the right figure, player 3 hides
vertex 2 and the IA selects the matching {(1, 3)}. Then, this A of IA is not giving incentive for full participation. On
the other hand, if for the left case, A selects {(1, 3)}, independently on the decision of A for the right case, all players
have incentive (or are indifferent) to reveal their full pools.
attained. Although individually rational mechanisms can guarantee a social optimum, note that this does not ensures
that players will participate with their full pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs. Let us clarify these statements by
recovering an example from Ashlagi et al. [2015]:
Example 2.2. Ashlagi et al. [2015] Consider a two-player kidney exchange game. The graph in Figure 2 represents
the overall compatibility graph.
Both players alone can match 2 vertices. This means that an individually rational mechanism must ensure that each
player has at least two of her vertices matched. Assume that the clearing house outputs a maximum matching. The
graph has two maximum matchings, M = {(2, 3), (4, 5), (6, 7)} and R = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6)}, and both have the
property of being individually rational. However, none of these two social optimal solutions is strategy-proof: under
M , player 1 has incentive to hide and match (5, 6), forcing the mechanism to select {(1, 2), (3, 4), }; under R, player
2 has incentive to hide and match (2, 3), forcing the mechanism to select {(4, 5), (6, 7)}.
On the other hand, the non-cooperative game theory approach overcomes the drawbacks of individually and strategy-
proof mechanisms: it was proven that there is always a social welfare equilibrium which can be efficiently computed
(polynomial time) and, for the 2-player case, the players have incentive to fully reveal their vertices since any solution
of the IA benefits equally both players. Clearly, ifA is designed such that it outputs a matching of maximum cardinality
prioritizing the players with more vertices revealed, then the full participation result extends to the N -player case; see
Figure 3. Furthermore:
Theorem 2.3. The computation of a maximum matching prioritizing the players with more vertices revealed can be
done in polynomial time.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In addition to the design of a game with good outcomes from social welfare point of view and from the players’
perspective in a cross-boarder KEP, the result of Theorem 2.1 has major consequences in the understanding of KEP. It
does not matter how we partition a pool of a KEP into different groups (players): there is always a Nash equilibrium
that is also a social optimum. For instance, in a KEP, players can be thought as agents owning incompatible pairs of
distinct regions, or distinct incomes, or distinct minorities, etc., and according to Theorem 2.1, independently on how
the players’ pairs are partitioned among them, there will always exist an equilibrium that is also a social optimum.
In a certain sense, such a result provides a theoretical explanation of why regional or national KEPs (e.g., in UK
and Netherlands where exchanges of size 2 are prioritized) can be satisfied with the solution of a single decision-
maker optimization problem. Nevertheless, as the computational results of Section 4 will highlight, these maximum
matchings must be carefully computed, since the number of maximum matchings can be large and only a very small
fraction of them can be Nash equilibria.
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3 Information on transplant’s quality: what changes?
Predicting the graft survival of a patient matched with a donor does not depend only on whether they are compatible,
but also on their health characteristics (age, life habits, etc.). This means that, for a set of compatible donors, a patient
associates a preference according to the predicted graft quality. Thus, when additional information on the quality of
transplantations is added to the kidney exchange game, it is expected that the players will weight that information
on their utility functions. For instance, a player optimization problem can become a maximization of a weighted
matching, instead of the cardinality one.
Let us emphasize the importance of having measures on the quality of a transplant. Akl et al. [2008] build 5-year graft
survival predictions for living-donors with a Cox regression-based monogram and an artificial neural network model.
Their motivation is to find the best prediction methodology since that would allow the choice of the best possible
kidney donor and the optimum immunosuppressive therapy for a given patient. In Nemati et al. [2014] their statistical
study shows that living-donor recipients have better graft survival rates in comparison with deceased-donation. Nev-
ertheless, there is literature supporting the fact that predicting these rates for living-donation can significantly improve
the hospitals allocation strategies, as even among living donors there can be significant differences. Krikov et al.
[2007] develop a tree-based model to predict the probability of kidney graft survival at 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years, either
with deceased and living donors. It is claimed that such predictions allow to identify the factors affecting the survival
that may help in improving treatment strategies. Lasserre et al. [2012] estimate glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) of
the recipient 1 year after the transplant. It is argued that since eGFR is an interpretable real-valued quantity, it might
be more helpful than a binary success/failure prediction. Massie et al. [2016] develop an index to be used as a metric
to compare multiple living donors. More recently, Luck et al. [2017] model a deep neural network to predict graft
survibability given a specific donor and patient; however, their experiments focus on deceased donors.
It is well known that maximum weighted matchings can be computed in polynomial time (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz
[1982]). Let wpe for e ∈ E encode the information on graft quality associated with that matching for player p. At first
glance, because on the kidney exchange game the objective functions of each player p (1) is replaced (generalized) by∑
e∈Mp
wpe +
∑
e∈MIp
wpe , (3)
it seems that the game would continue to be “easy to solve”. However, when a measure of graft quality is considered,
we prove that it becomes hard to compute a player best response and thus, to verify if a matching is an equilibrium.
Player p best response to a matching M−p corresponds to finding the internal matching Mp of Gp such that her total
weight is maximized; the IA objective is analogous with weights wvu = wivu + w
j
vu, for each edge (v, u) ∈ EI and
v ∈ V i and u ∈ V j . For sake of simplicity, in our investigation of player p’s best response, we assume that the IA
continues to maximize the cardinality matching in EI requiring that a A is specified; note that this is always possible
through a proper selection of the weights for the remaining players. We will simplify even further and assume that
the A either behaves pessimistically, i.e., the IA selects the matching of maximum cardinality that minimizes player
p’s utility, or optimistically, i.e., the IA selects her matching of maximum cardinality that maximizes player p’s utility.
The pessimistic (respectively, optimistic) decision version, denoted by PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE (respectively,
OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE), asks whether given a positive integer P , there is a matching Mp ⊆ Ep such that
player p has a profit of at least P .
Theorem 3.1. PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE and OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE are NP-complete.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The result of Theorem 3.1 might explain why some multi-agent kidney exchanges lead to so little transplantations
as reported in Agarwal et al. [2019]: the players objective function is not the number of patients receiving a kidney.
Moreover, in Carvalho et al. [2017] an example of a weighted kidney exchange game with no pure Nash equilibria
is provided. These observations motivate the computational analysis of the next section, where we aim to understand
the practical impact of these theoretically negative results, and thus, whether novel policies are required to address
multi-agent interactions in an attempt to get a kidney exchange program that engages agents and positively impacts
the social welfare. Additionally, we can conclude that computing any social optimum (i.e., to solve the problem as
a single decision-maker one) should not result in an equilibrium. In a non equilibrium outcome, players do not have
incentive to follow it ant to contribute with full information.
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4 Computational evidence
In this section, we will compute pure Nash equilibria of the kidney exchange game when each player goal is to
maximize the number of her patients receiving a kidney, objective function (1), and when the goal is to maximize the
total weight associated with her patients receiving a kidney, objective function (3). To that end, we will generate graphs
that mimic the realistic instances. The aim of this section is twofold: evaluate the rate of social welfare equilibria for
the cardinality case and the rate of pure Nash equilibria for the weighted case.
In Section 4.1, we clarify how we build our generator of instances and the algorithmic details to verify if a matching is
an equilibrium. In Section 4.2, we evaluate the rate of equilibria on the generated instances for the cardinality game,
denoted by #-KEG, and for the weighted game, denoted by W-KEG.
4.1 Implementation details
4.1.1 Test instances
Typically, the kidney exchange literature carries the computational analysis on graphs generated according to Saidman
et al. [2006]; compatibility graphs are generated based on probabilities of blood type and of donor-patient tissue com-
patibility that were obtained through data from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the United States.
Ashlagi and Roth [2012] show that, in practice, kidney exchange pools can be much sparser than the pools generated
by the Saidman simulator. For this reason, Glorie et al. [2014] introduced some modifications on this simulator. Con-
stantino et al. [2013] produced KEP instances with low, medium and high density graphs; the low density graphs have
on average a density similar to the ones by Saidman et al. [2006]. Since, there are no computational results on game
theoretical approaches using the aforementioned instances, we generated instances based on data from the Canadian
Kidney Paired Donation program (KPD), contributing with a new set of instances, as well as a generator2. Our set of
players are the Canadian provinces.
Generator of the KPD: The Canadian Blood Services provided us data on the KPD which enabled us to build the
instance generator described on Table 2. The only input parameters of the generator are |V |, the total number of
incompatible patient-donor pairs, and a year between 2009 and 2013. The prevalence of highly-sensitized patients,
i.e., patients with low probability of being compatible with a random donor, is generated based on the report Canadian
Blood Services [2014] for the years between 2009 and 2013. Determining the degree of sensitization is done through
the calculated panel reactive antibody (cPRA). For instance, according to that report, in 2009 there were approximately
14% patients on the KPD with cPRA≥ 97%, while in 2013 it increased to 53%; thus, this input parameter controls the
density of the instances.
Step 1
Assignment of pairs to provinces
Given |V |, our generator determines the number of pairs fromV belonging to each province
according to their distribution in the KPD data; see the pie chart Figure 4.
Step 2
Generation of players vertices/Generation of provinces’ pairs
Given a province and the number of pairs belonging to it (determined in the previous step), our
generator assigns to each pair, the patient blood group and cPRA, and the donor blood group.
This assignment is based on the patient-donor blood group distribution of that province, while
the cPRA distribution is based on its national distribution in the KPD (due to the lack of data
for each specific province). Patients are considered highly-sensitized when their cPRA is high
(high probability of being crossmatch incompatible). In Canadian Blood Services [2014], it is
reported the distribution of the cPRAs equal to 0%, between 1-50%, 51-94%, 95-96% and 97-
100% for each year between 2009 and 2013. This distribution changed along these 5 years,
and it seems to start stabilizing. However, we decided to leave as a parameter of our generator
the selection of the year determining the cPRA distribution; the reason for this is that on the
first year of the report, 2009, there were 14% of the patients with cPRA above 97%, while in
2013, they become 53% of the patients in the pool; by having the year as a parameter for the
cPRA distribution, we will be able to understand the impact of highly-sensitized patients in
the game outcome. The higher the cPRA value of a patient, the less likely is she compatible
with a random donor.
Step 3
Generation of edges/Generation of compatabilities among pairs
In order to build the edges representing reciprocal compatibilities between pairs, blood com-
patibility is verified and, if satisfied, an edge is draw with probability equal to the multipli-
cation of (1- cPRA) of the patients on that pairs (i.e., the probability of both patients being
compatible with the donors).
Table 2: Instance generator
For each |V | ∈ {30, 40, 50} and year ∈ {2009, 2013}, we generated the following instances:
• ins ∈ {1, . . . , 10}: 10 instances with all players (ten provinces);
• ins ∈ {11, . . . , 20}: 10 instances with 3 players (Ontario, British Columbia & Yukon and Alberta);
2Both the generator as well as the specific instances used in this paper can be obtained under request from the authors.
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Figure 4: Distribution of provinces size.
• ins ∈ {21, . . . , 30}: 10 instances with 3 players (Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island).
4.1.2 Algorithmic approach
For each instance, we compute (1) the K best solutions (game outcomes)3 and (2) verify for each of them if it is an
equilibrium, and, if yes, how close it is from a social optimum.
For #-KEG it is very likely the existence of multiple social optima, i.e., multiple matchings of maximum cardinality
and we know that there must be at least one that is an equilibrium. Thus, for these games, we will compute at
most K = 1, 000 random social optimal solutions (matchings of maximum cardinality) in task (1). In order to
uniformly generate 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality, we use the dynamic programming method described in
Appendix E. On the other hand, for W-KEG, the mutiplicity of maximum weighted matchings is less likely, no SWE
is guaranteed to exist and thus, we use the framework by Lawler [1972] to perform task (1) with K = 1, 000.
Let us now concentrate on task (2). Verifying if a matching M is a Nash equilibrium implies verifying that any player
p’s best response to M−p does not lead to an increase in the player’s utility in comparison with M ∩ Ep. Therefore,
to execute task (2) we will compute each player’s best response; in this context, we concentrate on the player’s best
responses in W-KEG, since it generalizes the best response computations under #-KEG (#-KEG is the special case
of W-KEG with weights equal to 1). Unless P = NP , a very unlikely event, Theorem 3.1 implies that there is
no polynomial time algorithm to compute a player best response and thus, to verify if a matching is an equilibrium.
Nevertheless, we were able to build an exact algorithm for this purpose that in practice, i.e., for the instances created
by our generator, runs in seconds. Furthermore, in order to compute best responses, A must be known. In this way,
for each maximum (weighted) matching, if there is a A making that matching an equilibrium, then it will be that one
used in the best response computation; note that this will bias the analyses in the direction of increasing the likelihood
of having equilibria. See Appendix D for details on this implementation.
In this context, we highlight that it is out of the scope of this paper to explore time improvements for the computational
implementations.
Our algorithmic implementations were in Python 3.7.1, except the algorithm of Appendix E which was coded in Julia
1.1.0; the latter was the most time consuming part of our experiments and thus, it benefited from the use of a compiled
language; nevertheless, we enforced a time limit of 2 hours for it. In case the time limit is reached, the corresponding
entry in the tables indicates “tl”. All the optimization problems have been solved with IBM CPLEX 12.9.0. The
experiments were conducted on an Intel Xeon E5-2637 processor clocked at 3.50GHz and equipped with 8 GB RAM,
using a single core.
3For few instances, there were less than K distinct matchings.
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4.2 Computational simulations
4.2.1 #-KEG
In our result Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, |M |max denotes the number of edges of the maximum cardinality matching,
#|M |max denotes the number of distinct matchings of size |M |max, % #-NE is the percentage of equilibria in the
sample of 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality, IMPmax denotes the maximum increase on utility obtained by a
province (or set of provinces) in an equilibrium in comparison with the maximum utility when restricted its individual
pool, Playersmax denotes the set of provinces reaching that maximum increase, IMPmin denotes the minimum
increase on utility obtained by a province (or set of provinces) in an equilibrium in comparison with the maximum
utility when restricted to its individual pool, Playersmin denotes the set of provinces reaching that minimum increase,
IAhigh and IAlow are the maximum and minimum number of international transplants in a computed equilibrium,
respectively, timegen is the time in seconds to uniformally generate 1, 000 matchings of maximum cardinality and
timeNE is the average time to verify if a sampled matching is an equilibrium.
Tables 3, 4 correspond to #-KEG with all the 10 provinces as players. As expected the instances associated with 2009
have matchings of higher cardinality and significantly higher number of maximum matchings in comparison with 2013.
Nevertheless, the density of the graphs does not seem to reflect any trend on the prevalence of SWE: for the instances
with 30 vertices, 2013 has a very high percentage of equilibria, while for the instances of size 40, there is no different
trend between 2009 and 2013 on the percentage of equilibria; for the instances of size 50 such comparison cannot
be made, as the algorithms on 2009 instances exceeded the time limit to samples equilibria. Under an equilibrium,
by definition, no player is worst than if she did not participated in the game, does the column IMPmin is always
non-negative. In fact, in our computational results it takes always the value 0; this means that there were SWE under
which there was at least a player that did not improve her utility. For example, Prince Edward Island appears always
in this column which can be explained by the fact that this is the smallest player and thus, less likely to contribute to
the exchanges. In opposition, Ontario, the largest player, is the one that appears the less in the column Playersmin.
From a fairness point of view, empirically this indicates that on SWE the players that contribute the most to the game
are compensated. Let us now concentrate on the column IMPmax. In general, the maximum increases on utility
are strictly positive. In column Playersmax, except for instances with very few matchings of maximum cardinality
(and thus, SWE), the smallest provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia, never get the highest increase under a SWE. Again, this seems to enforce that SWE are the “fair” game
outcome to concentrate as they benefit players according to their degree of participation. Finally, note that the average
times in timeNE show that this step can be done efficiently with our algorithm while the bottleneck is the sampling of
matchings of maximum cardinality. The results of this tables support the importance of using the concept of equilibria
both to reflect strategical behaviors and fairness on the Kidney Exchange outcome. Although, for the majority of
instances the percentage of SWE computed was higher than %50 (recall that we are using A such that the likelihood
of a matchings being an equilibrium is maximized), it is not guaranteed that simply using a maximum matching one
will have an equilibrium.
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Tables 6, 7, correspond to #-KEG with 3 players: Ontario, British Columbia & Yukon and Alberta. The results in the
tables indicate that when there are few matchings of maximum cardinality then the percentage of equilibria is very
high, while in the reverse case the percentage of equilibria is small. Even for the cases of size 40 and 50, for year
2013, the prevalence of equilibria decreases. Therefore, we can expect that in real instances that typically have more
than 100 pairs, there is a low number of equilibria, probably explained by the fact that players also have large sets
of feasible strategies. Thus, algorithms targeted to directly and efficiently compute become crucial. In this 3-player
setting, columns Playersmax and Playersmin, do not seem to present any trend, i.e., all three players seem to appear
similar number of times in both of them, which might be explained by the fact that this is a more balanced setting,
where players have similar contributions to the kidney exchange program.
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Tables 7, 8 correspond to #-KEG with 3 players: Ontario, Quebec and Prince Edward Island. In these results, it is
evident that Ontario and Quebec generally can take the most off a SWE (see column Playersmax). On the other hand,
for Prince Edward Island there is always an equilibrium under which this player gets no advantage from participating
in the market, except for instance |V | = 40, year 2009, ins = 24.
Among the results presented on this section, the number of players and their respective size does not seem to influence
the percentage of equilibria.
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Figure 5: Histogram of ages on the Canadian Kidney Paired Donation Program
4.2.2 W-KEG
W-KEG is not guaranteed to have a social welfare equilibrium, i.e., a Nash equilibrium that is a matching of maximum
weight. Thus, we concentrate on determining -SWE: the lower value of  such that a pure Nash equilibrium is at most
 away of the maximum weighted matching.
In the following results, the goal of the IA is to compute a maximum weighted international matching, as referred to in
the beginning of this section. Due to the lack of data on donors’ characteristics fundamental to compute quantities such
as Risk Index for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation or to use machine learning models to predict graft survival,
we generated the weights for this game according to the donors’ age distribution on the Canadian Kidney Paired
Donation Program; see Figure 5. From the original data, we generated random ages with replacement (bootstrapping).
Indeed, the literature on kidney transplantion has empirically demonstrated that donors’ age is a significant predictor
of graft survivability Terasaki et al. [1997], Berger et al. [2011]. In order to generate weights, we sample uniformly
with replacement from the data points x with donors’ age; let xu be an element of our sampling, then the weights are
generated as follows:
wuv =
−xu + max(x)
max(x)
, ∀u ∈ N(v).
In this way, a younger donor has associated higher weights. Note that the formula above generates normalized weights,
i.e., between 0 and 1.
Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 8, summarize our computational results concerning W-KEG. In these tables, we do not report
the value of the maximum weighted matching since it is not easy to understand its meaning as in the cardinality case.
Therefore, the tables provide relative results. For instance, K are the best K maximum weighted matchings (which
will be at most 1, 000), % W-NE is the percentage of equilibria among the best K maximum weighted matchings, 
is the ratio between the first computed weighted matching that is an equilibrium (iter-th matching) and the maximum
weighted matching; when an equilibrium is not found, the table reports the maximum value for ; note that  close
to 1 means that the first equilibirum computed is close to be a social optimum; iter is the iteration in which the
first equilibrium is determined; Playersmax and Playersmin are defined as before; IMPmax and IMPmin are
the maximum and minimum utility increases under equilibria divided by the total weight of the first equilibrium
determined (so that this value is always smaller than 1); finally, IAhigh and IAlow are the maximum and minimum
fraction of international edges among the equilibria computed, respectively.
In Tables 9, 10, all 10 provinces participate in the game. Instances associated with year 2013 seem to be more likely
to have a SWE, which can be explained by the fact that these correspond to sparse graphs where players have less
alternative strategies to deviate to. In these results, there is a significant number of instances for which in the K best
18
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weighted matchings there was no equilibria; in fact, e.g., for instance |V | = 30, year 2009, ins = 2, there are no
pure equilibria. Columns Playermax and Playermin seem to present the trend saw on the #-KEG results: the four
smallest provinces typically appear in Playermin while the largest appear in Playermax . On the other hand, while
in #-KEG there was usually more than one province achieving the maximum improvement, here, in general, there is a
single province attaining the maximum advantage.
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Tables 11 and 12 report our computational results concerning W-KEG with the three largest provinces. In a majority
of instances, the percentage of equilibria is small, in particular for all instances of size |V | = 50. This might be
explained by the fact that all players own a significant percentage of the pairs in the game and thus, they have more
feasible strategies, which reflects to incentives for deviating from a k-th best weighted matching. It is interesting to
note, that among all players, the largest one, Ontario, appears few times in the column Playersmin meaning that these
K best weighted matchings seem to fairly compensate the contribution of this player. Finally, observe that in most of
the instances, IA establishes a significant benefit for international exchanges.
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Tables 13 and 14 report our computational results concerning W-KEG with a large, medium and a small player.
Most of these instances have a -SWE with  < 2, while with the results with ten players a -SWE failed to be
found. Combining this with the fact that the first -SWE is generally determined before the K2 -th best weighted
matching, it can be argued that these -SWE can be reasonable solutions for the game as the social optimum is not
significantly sacrificed. Prince Edward Island is almost always present in the column Playersmin, while in the column
Playersmax Ontario appears more often than Quebec and Prince Edward Island almost does not appear. Once again,
this seems to indicate that equilibria provide fair benefits to the participating players.
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5 Conclusions and open questions
In this work, we reviewed the literature on cross-border Kidney Exchange Programs, and motivated the reason to
concentrate on the non-cooperative game theoretical approach. Known results for the two-player case were generalized
to an arbitrary finite number of players. In this context, for #-KEG (1) it was discussed the mechanism that incentives
players to fully disclose their compatibility graphs and (2) it was established the existence of social welfare equilibria
which can be computed in polynomial time, stressing the feasibility of such solution being computed and used in
practice. Furthermore, it was anticipated how the game outcome would change upon the availability of information
on transplants quality. Namely, we proved that the verification of Nash equilibrium for the W-KEG becomes an NP-
complete problem, which is an indication that such solution might not be practical. Nevertheless, our computational
results have shown that, in practice, this is a tractable problem (recall Section 4, in particular, columns timeNE on
the computational results tables). Finally, on our computational results, we tested the concept of Nash equilibria on
instances closely inspired by the topology of the Canadian Kidney Pair Donation Program. These results demonstrated
that for the #-KEG, random selection of a social optimal solution might not result in an equilibrium, revealing the need
to use this concept. Interestingly, the computed social welfare equilibria provide a good balance in terms of advantage
to the participating players. In what concerns W-KEG, computational results show that SWE might fail to exist and
even (pure) equilibria might not exist. Nevertheless, a majority of instances had equilibria, which did not seem to be
far from social optimal solutions.
The analysis of this game theoretical model opens interesting research directions. The #-KEG enjoys excellent prop-
erties from the players and social welfare point of view and thus, its seems a promising model to extend the study,
namely, to exchanges of size larger than 2 and to include chains. However, once exchanges of size 3 are allowed, SWE
might not exist (see the example in Figure 6) and if there are 3 players, the game might not have a pure equilibrium (see
Figure 7). A possible way to overcome these issues can be to restrict the IA to exchanges of size 2 or consider that the
game is played over time, so as cooperation might be achieved because players can punish any disobedient on future
plays. Still on the extensions to exchanges of larger size, an interesting study would be about the characterization of
correlated equilibria. Correlated equilibrium is a more broader concept than Nash equilibrium, and thus, their relation
with social optima would be of interest to evaluate. Our computational results on #-KEG show that KEPs can easily
have multiple optimal solutions and thus, for sake of fairness and proper evaluation of KEPs outcomes, it is crucial to
develop tools that enable the generation of random optimal solutions.
This work also studied for the first time W-KEG. Under this setting, although examples can be found where equilibria
do not exist, the computational results reveal that, in practice, the social optimum might not be too sacrificed in order
to get an equilibrium. Ideally, one would prefer to have theoretical guarantees. Some criticism might be pointed out to
this game model: players might manipulate the information provided in order to associate high weights to exchanges
that would benefit their patients and/or players use different technologies to evaluate pairs health. Thus, fundamental
future research is in the development of a mechanism available for the players to associate weights that minimize
players manipulation or differences among players’ evaluation of the pairs. An interesting alternative could be to
allow players to provide a list of preferences to their potential transplants; in this way, two games would be played:
countries play #-KEG (game 1) while guaranteeing that their pairs are under a stable matching (game 2), i.e., no two
pairs would be better off (higher in their preference list) by leaving their current match and establishing a matching
among them. The ideas is that players seek an equilibrium to #-KEG which is also a stable matching. Finally, since it
has been argued that in living donations the primary goal is to maximize the number of transplants, one could consider
a game where players follow a hierarchycal optimization, where first they aim to maximize the number of their patients
receiving a transplant and second, among all solutions that lead to the same number of their patients matched, they
maximize matchings’ weights.
In conclusion, there are many important points both on modeling cross boarder Kidney Exchange Programs and on
their analysis that need to be addressed and, in this paper, we provided a consistence base to support further research.
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5 4
1 2
3
76
Figure 6: A game instance with l = 3. The social optimum (in blue) is 6 but the only equilibrium is for the gray player
to select her internal cycle of length 3.
1 2 3 4 5
6 7
8 9
10
Figure 7: Player square has only the strategy ∅; Player ball has two possible strategies ∅ and (6, 4, 7); Player diamond
has two possible strategies ∅ and (3, 10, 2). The IA selects cycle (1,6,2) and (4,3,10) when no internal exchange is
selected.
A Proof of Theorem 2.1
For sake of clarity and in order to make the paper self contained, we recall some known results on matching theory
and kidney exchange games.
Algorithm A.0.1 recalls the high level computation of a maximum matching. Edmonds [1965] proved that step 2 can
run in polynomial time which implies that the full algorithm also runs in polynomial time.
Algorithm A.0.1 Computation of a maximum matching for graph G given a matching M (possibly, M = ∅).
1: for v ∈ V , M -unmatched do
2: Find a M -augmenting path p starting in v
3: if p exists then
4: M := M ⊕ p # ⊕ represents the symmetric difference of two sets
5: end if
6: end for
7: return M
Next, we recover from Carvalho et al. [2017] the theorem providing the necessary and sufficient condition under which
a player has incentive to deviate from a maximum matching. For an illustration of their result see Figures 8 and 9.
Theorem A.1. Let M be a maximum matching. A player p ∈ N has incentive to deviate from M ∩ Ep if and only if
1. there is aMp∪(M ∩ EI)-alternating path p inGp = (V,Ep∪EI) whose origin is a node in V p, unmatched
in this path, and the destination is a M ∩ EIp -matched node in V −p and
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1 2 3
456
7
M
M
M
1 2 3
456
7
M ⊕ p
M ⊕ p
M ⊕ p
Figure 8: Player 1 owns the white circles, player 2 owns the gray diamonds and player 3 owns the magenta squares. If
p = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), player 1 has incentive to deviate from M ∩ E1 = {(5, 4)} to (M ⊕ p) ∩ E1 = {(6, 5)}, since
A(M ⊕ p) = {(4, 3), (2, 1)}, resulting in more vertices of player 1 matched.
1 2 3
456
7 8 9
M
M
M
M
1 2 3
456
7 8 9
M ⊕ p
M ⊕ p
A
(−−−−−−−−−→
(M ⊕ p) ∩ E1
)
A
(−−−−−−−−−→
(M ⊕ p) ∩ E1
)
Figure 9: Player 1 owns the white circles, player 2 owns the gray diamonds and player 3 owns the magenta squares.
Suppose algorithm A takes decisions accordingly with the figures above. If p = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), player 1 does
not have incentive to deviate from M ∩ E1 = {(5, 4)} to (M ⊕ p) ∩ E1 = ∅ because algorithm A does not output
matchings (5, 6) and (7, 8), but (6, 7) and (8, 9) which is also maximum (external) matching.
2. A
(−−−−→
M ⊕ p
)
is equal to (M ⊕ p) ∩ EI4.
The results above will enable us to prove Theorem 2.1. To that end we introduce the definition of maximal M -
augmenting path in GD = (V ∪ D, E ∪ ED) which is a M -alternating path starting in a M -unmatched vertex of
V , ending in a edge of ED which cannot be removed and replaced by other edges without the path stopping to be
M -augmenting. Now, we have all elements to build the overall algorithm that we denote as Algorithm A.0.2.
Algorithm A.0.2 Computation of a SWE given a maximum matching M .
1: D := {d(u,v), d(v,u) : (u, v) ∈ EI ∩M,u ∈ V i, v ∈ V j , i 6= j}
2: ED := {(du,v, u) : d(u,v) ∈ D}
3: GD := (V ∪ D, E ∪ ED)
4: M¯ := M // obtained from Algorithm A.0.1
5: while there is a maximal M¯ -augmenting path p in GD do
6: M¯ := M¯ ⊕ p
7: end while
8: return M¯
The correctness of Algorithm A.0.2 is proven by the following theorem.
4This condition is not on the original paper Carvalho et al. [2017] which is restricted to the two-player case, where players are
indifferent about A.
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Theorem A.2. If for an output of Algorithm A.0.2, A
(−→¯
M
)
= M¯ ∩ EI , then M¯ is a SWE and it can be computed in
polynomial time.
Proof. By construction, M¯ is a maximum matching of G: M¯ starts by being a maximum matching of G, step 4, and
afterwards, maximal M¯ -alternating paths in GD are applied to M¯ which does not change the cardinality of M¯ in G
(but augments the number of vertices matched in GD). Therefore, the output M¯ is a social optimum. It remains to
show that M¯ is a Nash equilibrium. To that end, one must prove that there is no M¯ -alternating path as in Theorem A.1.
Let us define P as the set of disjoint paths obtained through M¯ ⊕M ; M¯ and M are maximum matchings of G, thus
the operation ⊕ leads to cycles of even size and paths. Note that M¯ = M ⊕p∈P p. By construction, any path in P is a
maximal M -augmenting path in GD.
By contradiction, suppose that p = (v1, . . . , vk) is a M¯ -alternating path in G as in Theorem A.1. If p is a maximal
M -augmenting path in GD, then it should have been found in step 5 (or was contained in a maximal M -augmenting
path in GD). Thus, p is not maximal M -augmenting path, i.e., it is not in P . This implies that v1 is M¯ -matched with a
du,v1 ∈ D. Let pˆ ∈ P be the path containing the edge (dv1,u, v1), then pˆ is not a maximal M -augmenting path in GD,
since it could have been extended through p (ending in (dvk,r, r)).
Algorithm A.0.2 can run in polynomial time since its most consuming time operation, step 5, can be done in polynomial
time; recall Algorithm A.0.1.
Finally, we relax the previous theorem dependence in the output of A. First, make M equal to
(
M˜ \ EI
)
∪A
(−→˜
M
)
,
where M˜ is a maximum matching, and give it as input for Algorithm A.0.2. Now, proceed as in the previous proof
to compute P , but without edges in ED. Each p ∈ P can be partitioned in p1, p2, . . . , pk such that p = p1p2 . . . pk
and each pi ∈ Ep ∪ EI . For each p, while A agrees with the application of pi to M through operation ⊕ ( i.e.,
A
(−−−−→
M ⊕ pi
)
= (M ⊕ pi) ∩ EI ), do M = M ⊕ pi. In the end, by the same arguments as the previous proof, the
obtained M is an equilibrium.
B Proof of Theorem 2.3
Without loss of generality, assume that the players’ set of revealed vertices satisfy |V 1| ≥ |V 2| ≥ . . . ≥ |V n|.
The optimal solution of the following maximum weighted matching is a maximum matching and prioritizes the players
with more vertices revealed:
max
y
∑
(u,v)∈EI
yu,vwu,v (4a)
s.t.
∑
(u,v)∈EI
yu,v ≤ 1 ∀u ∈ V (4b)
yu,v ∈ {0, 1} ∀(u, v) ∈ EI , (4c)
where wu,v is equal to (|V 1|+ |V 2|)|V |+ |V i|+ |V j | for u ∈ V i and v ∈ V j . Note that Problem (4) is a maximum
weighted matching and thus, it can be solved in polynomial time.
Next, we split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims.
Claim B.1. The optimal solution of Problem (4) is a maximum cardinality matching
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A maximum cartinality matching M has weight at least |M | ((|V 1|+ |V 2|)|V |+ |V n−1|+ |V n|). Suppose that a
maximum weighted matching M¯ is not of maximum cardinality. Then, it has weight at most
|M¯ | ((|V 1|+ |V 2|)|V |+ |V 1|+ |V 2|) =|M¯ | (|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|V |+ 1)
≤ (|M | − 1) (|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|V |+ 1)
=|M | (|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|V |+ 1)
− (|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|V |+ 1)
=|M | (|V 1|+ |V 2|) |V |+
|M | (|V 1|+ |V 2|)−(|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|V |+ 1)
=|M | (|V 1|+ |V 2|) |V |+(|V 1|+ |V 2|) (|M | − |V | − 1)
≤|M | (|V 1|+ |V 2|) |V |
which contradicts the fact that M¯ is a maximum weighted matching.
Claim B.2. The optimal solution of Problem (4) prioritizes the players with more revealed vertices.
Suppose that there is a M solution for Problem (4) and a M¯ with |M | = |M¯ |, such that |M1| = |M¯1|, |M2| = |M¯2|,
. . ., |Mp−1| = |M¯p−1| and |Mp| < |M¯p|. Then, there is a path p in M ⊕ M¯ such that it starts in an edge (u0, v0) ∈ M¯
with u0 ∈ V p and ends in an edge (uf , vf ) ∈ M with vf /∈ V p. Therefore, it holds
∑
e∈M∩p we <
∑
e∈M¯∩p we
which implies that M is not the optimum of Problem (4).
C Proof of Theorem 3.1
Next, we show that PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete even when player p’s internal graph is bipartite.
To that end, we reduce in polynomial time the following NP-complete problem to PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
Problem: FEEDBACK VERTEX SET
Instance: A diagraph G = (V,A) and a positive integer l.
Question: Does there exist a set V ′ ⊆ V such that
|V ′| ≤ l and G′ = (V \ V ′, A) has no directed cycle?
(FVS)
Lemma C.1. PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete
Proof. We split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims.
Claim C.2. PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is in NP.
Given Mp, the pessimistic IA problem can be solved in polynomial time. Compute (in polynomial time) a maximum
cardinality matching for IA given Mp. Let k be the size of such matching. Then, the IA problem reduces to find
a minimum weighted matching for player p of cardinality k which is equivalent to the well-known k-cardinality
assigment problem. A k-cardinality assigment problem can be solved in polynomial time Dell’Amico and Martello
[1997], Dell’Amico et al. [2001].
Claim C.3. PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-hard.
First, we reduce in polynomial time, an instance of FEEDBACK VERTEX SET to one of PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
• Let N = {A,B} with p = A.
• Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. Set V A = V ∪ L with L = {1, 2, . . . , l} and V B = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′n}.
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• Set EA = {(i, j) : i ∈ L, j ∈ V } and wAe = 2 for e ∈ EA. Note that GA is bipartite. See Figure 10.
• EI = Id ∪ A with Id = {(vi, v′j) : i = j} and A = {(vi, v′j) : (vi, vj) ∈ A}, and wAe = n for e ∈ Id and
wAe = 1 for e ∈ A. See Figure 11.
• Set P = 2l + n(n− l).
We claim that in the constructed instance of PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE, player A can have a profit of 2l+n(n−l)
if and only if the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance has answer YES.
Proof of if. Assume the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance has answer YES. Then, there is a V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≤ l
such that G′ = (V \ V ′, A) does not contain any directed cycle. Set MA = {(i, vi) : vi ∈ V ′}, leading to an internal
profit of 2|V ′|. Now, the vertices vi ∈ V ′ are MA-matched and thus are not available for the IA. In this way, the
maximum cardinality matching for the IA is n − |V ′| (number of player A’s vertices available for the IA), which can
be attained by matching (vi, v′i) for vi ∈ V \V ′. However, the IA has incentive to avoid to select edges in Id since they
have associated a weight of n for player A. If there is an IA matching of maximum cardinality n−|V ′| that contains an
edge (vi, v′j) ∈ A, then there is a cycle in the FEEDBACK VERTEX SET instance: vj must be matched with v′j1 , j1 6= j,
vj1 must be matched with v
′
j2
, j1 6= j2, . . . , vjk is matched with v′i (note that there is a finite number of vertices); then,
(vi, vj1 , vj2 , . . . , vjk , vi) is a cycle in G
′. Therefore, player A profit is 2|V ′| + n(n − |V ′|) ≥ 2l + n(n − l) since
|V ′| ≤ l.
Proof of only if. Now assume that the PESSIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is a YES instance. Then, there is MA ⊆ EA
such that player A’s profit is equal or greater to 2l + n(n− 1). Let V ′ be equal to the set of MA-matched vertices in
V . Note that |V ′| ≤ l, since GA is bipartite with the vertices partition L with size l. If the IA matching M I for MA
is not contained in Id, as show in the proof of if, there is a cycle in G′ of size at least 2. Recall that the IA behaves
pessimistically for player A and thus, she has incentive to select matchings associated with cycles in G′. Therefore,
player A has incentive to match internally l vertices which means |V ′| = l. In this way, player A’s profit is equal or
less than 2l+ 2 +n(n− 2− l) which contradicts the fact that player A’s profit was equal or greater than 2l+n(n− l).
1
2
...
l
vi
2
2
2
2
Figure 10: Gadget i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Next, we show that OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete. To that end, we reduce in polynomial time the
following NP-complete problem to OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE:
Problem: 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING
Instance: Given sets X , Y , Z, each of size n, and a set T ⊂ X × Y × Z.
Question: Is there a set of n triples in T such that
each element is contained in exactly one triplet?
(3-DIM)
Lemma C.4. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-complete.
Proof. We split the proof in two parts by proving the following claims.
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Figure 11: Gadget i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Claim C.5. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is in NP.
GivenMp, we can solve the optimistic IA problem in polynomial time by reducing it to a maximum weighted matching
problem using a standard trick: replace the weightswpe for e ∈ EIp bywpe+|V −p|wmax and the remaining e ∈ EI \EIp
by wmin −  + |V −p|wmax, where wmax = maxe∈EIp wpe wmin = mine∈EIp wpe and wmin −  > 0; with these new
weights, the corresponding maximum weighted matching M¯ is always a matching of maximum cardinality plus it is
the one that benefits the most player p.
-M¯ is a maximum matching in the international graph. A maximum matching M has weight at least
|M |(wmin −  + |V −p|wmax) . Suppose that M¯ is not a maximum matching. The maximum weighted
matching M¯ has weight at most
|M¯ |(wmax + |V −p|wmax) = |M¯ |wmax(1 + |V −p|)
≤ (|M¯ | − 1)wmax(1 + |V −p|)
= |M¯ |wmax(1 + |V −p|)− wmax(1 + |V −p|)
= |M¯ |wmax|V −p|+ |M¯ |wmax − wmax(1 + |V −p|)
= |M¯ |wmax|V −p|+ wmax(|M¯ | − 1− |V −p|)
< |M¯ |wmax|V −p|
but M has a higher weight, which contradicts the fact that M¯ is a maximum weighted matching for the
international graph.
-M¯ is the optimistic matching for player p. Otherwise, suppose that there is a maximum cardinality matching M
of the international graph that leads to a higher weighted matching for player p. Since both M and M¯ have
maximum cardinality, then |M ∩ EI−p| < |M¯ ∩ EI−p| and |M ∩ EIp | > |M¯ ∩ EIp |. However, any edge in
EI−p has weight wmin −  + |V −p| which is strictly smaller than the weight of any edge in EIp (which is
we + |V −p|), implying that M¯ would not have been optimal.
Claim C.6. OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is NP-hard.
First, we reduce in polynomial time, an instance of 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING to one of OPTIMISTIC BEST RE-
SPONSE:
• Let N = {A,B} with p = A.
• Let T = {t1, t2, . . . , t|T |}. Make V A = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ T ∪ T x ∪ T y ∪ T z , where T (·) = {t(·)1 , t(·)2 , . . . , t(·)|T |}
(that is, we make 3 copies of each t ∈ T ). Make V B = T ∪ T ′, where T ′ = {t′1, t′2, . . . , t′|T |} (that is, a copy
of T ).
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• Set EA = {(xi, txl ), (yj , tyl ), (zk, tzl ) : tl = (xi, yj , zk) ∈ T} and
EI = {(tx, t), (ty, t), (tz, t), (t, t), (t, t′) : t′ ∈ T ′}. All edges have weight 1, except nodes (t, t) ∈ EI that
have weight 2|T |. See Figure 12.
• Set P = 3n+ 2n|T |+ 2(|T | − n).
xi yj zk
tx ty tz
t t t′
1 1 1
1 1
1
2|T | 1
Figure 12: Gadget t = (xi, yj , zk) ∈ T . Gray vertices belong to player A and white vertices belong to player B.
We claim that in the constructed instance of OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE, player A can have a profit of at least
P = 3n+ 2n|T |+ 2(|T | − n) if and only if the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING instance has answer YES.
Proof of if. Assume the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING instance has answer YES. Then, there is a 3-dimensional
matching M ⊂ T of size n. Select the internal matching MA = {(xi, txl ), (yj , tyl ), (zk, tzl ) : tl ∈ M}. Note that
MA is a matching since w.l.o.g. if (xi, txl ), (xi, t
x
r ) ∈ MA, then tl and tr are in M , meaning that M was not a valid
3-dimensional matching. This gives an internal profit for player A equal to 3n . For all gadgets t, the optimistic IA
selects the edge (t, t) ∈ EI leading to a total weight of 2n|T |. Finally, for all the gadgets t /∈ M , the IA has to select
a matching of cardinality 2 which can be (tx, t), (t, t′), leading to a total weight of 2(|T | − n). In this way, player A’s
profit is equal to 3n+ 2n|T |+ 2(|T | − n) = P.
Proof of only if. Now, assume that the OPTIMISTIC BEST RESPONSE is a YES instance. Then, there is MA such
that player A’s profit is greater or equal to P = 3n + 2n|T | + 2(|T | − n). If this internal matching does not match
tx, ty and tz for any gadget t, the optimistic IA has always a matching of size two available in each gadget, leading
to a profit of at most 4|T | that is less than P . In this way, player A must match internally as many as possible of the
vertices tx, ty and tz for each gadget t so that the IA does not have available the external matching of size 2 and it is
forced to choose (t, t) with weight 2|T |. Whenever this is done, player A adds 3 + 2|T | to her profit. If only k < n
gadgets have all tx, ty and tz matched internally, the utility is at most 3k+ 2k|T |+ 4(|T | − k). If k = n− 1, we have
utility equal to 3(n−1) + 2(n−1)|T |+ 4(|T |−n+ 1) = 3n+ 2n|T |+ 2(|T |−n) +
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− n, which is smaller than P .
D Verifying Equilibria
Algorithm D.0.1 enables to verify if there is an algorithm A such that a player p has no incentive to deviate from
a matching M : player p utility under M is a lower bound LB for her best response to M−p; player p’s opponents
strategies are fixed to M−p; player p optimal solution when she controls the IA output and does not repeat previous
evaluated solutions is determined leading to an upper bound UB; if the UB is less or equal to LB the player p has no
incentive to deviate and the algorithm returns True; otherwise, the IA decision for new player p strategy is determined
and it is evaluated if it improves player p solutions (i.e., if it is greater than LB); if yes, the algorithm returns False,
otherwise, it computes a new strategy for player p.
Algorithm D.0.2 computes the IA solution that minimizes the benefits for player p.
E Uniform generation of maximum matchings
In Dyer [2003] a dynamic programming method for counting the number of optimal solutions for a multiple-knapsack
is presented; furthermore, such computation is then used to uniformly generate optimal solutions. We adapt this paper
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Algorithm D.0.1 Return True if player p has no incentive to deviate from given (Mp,M−p), and False otherwise.
1: xp,0 ← binary vector of iteration 0 with one entry for each edge in Ep, where an entry is 1 if the associated edge
is in Mp and 0, otherwise. # Representation of player p’s strategy
k ← 1
aux = True # represents the non-incentive to deviate
LB ←∑e∈Mp wpe +∑e∈M∩EIp wpe # Player p utility under M
2: for j ∈ N \ {p} do
3: xj ← binary vector with one entry for each edge in Ej , where an entry is 1 if the associated edge is in M j and
0, otherwise. # Representation of player j’s strategy
4: end for
5: while aux do
6: Solve
(xp,k, y¯) = argmax
x,y∈{0,1}
∑
e∈Ep
wex
p
e +
∑
e∈EIp
wpeye (6a)
s.t.
∑
e∈Ep:i∈e
xpe +
∑
e∈EIp :i∈e
ye ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V p (6b)
∑
e∈EIp :i∈e
ye ≤ 1−
N∑
j=1
∑
e∈Ej :i∈e
xje ∀i ∈ V −p (6c)
∑
e∈Ep:xp,je =0
xpe +
∑
e∈Ep:xp,je =1
1− xpe ≥ 1 j = 0, . . . , k − 1, (6d)
where the solutions, xp,k and y¯ represent a matching in Ep and in EI , respectively. Let UB be the optimal
objective value of Problem (6).
7: if Optimization (6) infeasible or UB ≤ LB then
8: return aux # which is True, i.e., no incentive to deviate
9: end if
10: yk ← Algorithm D.0.2 for xp,k
11: if
∑
e∈Ep wex
p,k
e +
∑
e∈EIp w
p
ey
k
e > LB then
12: return False # i.e., incentive to deviate
13: end if
14: k ← k + 1
15: end while
Algorithm D.0.2 Compute an IA decision that minimizes player p utility for (x−p, xp,k).
1: Let OPT k be the optimal value to the IA given (x−p, xp,k).
2: Solve # minimize player p utility
yk = arg min
y∈{0,1}
∑
e∈EIp
wpeye (7a)
s.t.
∑
e∈EIp :i∈e
ye ≤ 1−
∑
e∈Ep:i∈e
xp,ke ∀i ∈ V p (7b)
∑
e∈EI :i∈e
ye ≤ 1−
N∑
j=1
∑
e∈Ej :i∈e
xje ∀i ∈ V −p (7c)∑
e∈EI
weye ≥ OPT k# keep IA solution optimal (7d)
3: return yk
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idea to our matching polytope ∑
e∈E:i∈e
xe ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V (8a)∑
e∈E
xe = OPT (8b)
xe ∈ {0, 1} ∀e ∈ E, (8c)
where OPT is the size of a maximum cardinality matching.
Our strategy for the uniform generation of maximum matchings will be based on counting them as we describe next.
Let F (K, r, s) for a graph G = (V,E) be the number of matchings with cardinality K when the subset of edges
{e1, e2, . . . , er} ⊆ E = {e1, e2, . . . , em} and the subset of vertices {v ∈ V : sv = 1} are available (s is a binary vec-
tor of size |V | that represents the vertices available). We aim to determine F (OPT,m, s′) when s′ = [1, 1, . . . , 1], i.e.,
the number of matchings with maximum cardinality. This can be done through the dynamic programming recursion
F (K, r, s) =

0, K < 0 ∨ r < 0 ∨min(s) < 0 (the entries of F must be non negative)
0, K > r (there is no matching)
1, K = 0 ∧ r ≥ 0 ∧min(s) ≥ 0 (there is one matching: ∅)
0, K > 0 ∧ r = 0 ∧min(s) ≥ 0 (there is no matching)
F (K, r − 1, s)+
F (K − 1, r − 1, sˆ) K > 0 ∧ r > 0 ∧min(s) ≥ 0 (number of matchings not using er
plus number of matchings using er )
where sˆi = si, except for i ∈ er where sˆi = si − 1, i.e., if edge er is part of a matching then the incident vertices
become matched and thus, unavailable for the subsequent recursions. The computational time of this approach is
O(|E|22|V |).
The F (·) table can be used to determine a uniform point in (8), by tracing back probabilistically from F (OPT,m, s),
as follows: with probability F (OPT,m−1,s
′)
F (OPT,m,s′) set xem = 0, else set xem = 1; if xem = 0, recursively determine xem−1 ,
. . ., xe1 by tracing back from F (OPT,m− 1, s′) and if xem = 1, trace back similarly from F (OPT − 1,m− 1, sˆ′).
The resulting matching has probability 1F (OPT,m,s′) of being sampled, i.e., it is uniformly generated.
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